The following quote is taken from The Logic of Perfection by Charles Hartshorne, page 23. This book is quickly becoming one of the best theological works I have read, in terms of style, structure, and content. Below, he lucidly explains the core of the freewill argument in a way that I have never read before.

The basic issue about determinism is this: the world is full of arbitrary matters of fact, arbitrary definitiveness; either this definition was already given, once and for all, even in the remotest past, or new definitiveness is added from time to time (more reasonably, in every instant). In the latter view, we human adults may, in higher degree than most creatures, contribute to the definitiveness of the world. It is no mere question of liking our causally-appointed roles -- finding our chains agreeable or imperceptible -- but of making these roles in some degree. Either we have a hand in the authorship of the play, or we are mere actors, and even less than actors, for these in concrete fact always in some measure, and unpredictably, create the play as enacted. This is the real metaphysical question of freedom.

My answer is both. I realize this is a trite response, but I see none other. One commonly finds that philosophical problems like these arise from cognitive limitations. I see the solution as this: Each present moment or instance changes the fabric of spacetime within an immutable set of natural laws. I am essentially suggesting that the only constant or absolute or necessity is change, and that natural laws reveal identically reproducible instances of ordered spacetime experienced as a string of instances.