Here, I show that the god of the Bible (hereafter, called God) is a being for whom existence is logically impossible. To begin, I define a concept, specify the concept of God as such, and examine that concept's claim to intelligibility as an object of faith.
Let us begin by exploring the definition of a concept. A concept is defined by Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary as "something conceived in the mind," like a thought or notion, and "an abstract or generic idea generalized from particular instances."
The concept of God requires a finite array of mutually dependent properties derived from the Bible. Properties include, but are not limited to, the following:
- Creator of universe (Genesis 1:1)
- Omnipotence (Genesis 17:1)
- Omniscience (Psalm 139:1-6)
- Omnipresence (Psalm 139:7-13)
God as the creator of the universe is self-explanatory. Omnipotence means all-powerful, omniscience means all-knowing, and omnipresence means everpresent everywhere. Omnipotence entails omniscience and omnipresence.
The concept becomes incomplete or unintelligible if:
- At least one of these properties is shown to contradict one or more other properties, or
- At least one of these properties is shown to be internally contradictory
I find a number of cases in which (1) and (2) prove true. I will consider one case proving (1) in which the property that God as creator of the universe contradicts the property that God is omnipotent and one case proving (2) in which the property that God is omniscient is internally contradictory.
First, consider God's creation of the universe. It is necessarily true that a creator creates for a purpose. To have a purpose is to have a desire. To have a desire is to lack the object of that desire. Yet, God is omnipotent and one who is omnipotent has no desire to create, given that such a desire entails a lack of attainment or power. Thus, it necessarily follows that God cannot simultaneously be a creator and omnipotent.
Second, consider the property of God's omniscience. Omniscience is the knowledge of everything. This implies that knowledge is composed of a finite set of knowable things. Yet, God cannot know that he knows everything without knowing something about everything, and this metaknowledge must necessarily exist outside the set of all knowable things. Metaknowledge is knowledge about knowledge, so it is a form of knowledge in its own right. Thus, to know everything that can be known, God must know everything that can be known plus the fact that he knows everything. This presents a contradiction. Therefore, omniscience is an internally contradictory property and God cannot be omniscient.
Given these contradictions, the concept of God is unintelligible. Other properties of God are given in the Bible, but those I have listed suffice to prove that God cannot be known at a basic, conceptual level. The statement “God exists†is not only unproven, but also unprovable, since the concept of God is unintelligible.
No unintelligible concept can exist. To use a common example, no square circles can exist, because the properties of squares and circles are fundamentally incompatible, leaving the concept of a square circle internally contradictory. Since that which is actual must be known conceptually, that which is internally contradictory in concept cannot be internally consistent in actuality. In short, an unintelligible concept cannot exist, God is such a concept, so God cannot exist.
Sources
1. "concept." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2005.
http://www.merriam-webster.com (12 Sept. 2005).
* This is a summary of my opening statement, excluding symbolic logic.
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Fri, 2005-09-30 15:01
Because you are all powerful means you have everything? That makes no sense at all.
Fri, 2005-09-30 15:17
Quote me where I define omnipotence as having everything. If I did write that, then I will correct it, since it is of course nonsensical.
Sat, 2005-10-01 18:24
You know, your post reminds me a lot like the stories of many, many people before you. Please, keep searching for reasons not to beleive. At the end of the day, God will prove himself to you over and over again.
PA
Sun, 2005-10-02 00:18
Faith is always faith in something. When that something is incomprehensible due to definitional contradictions, then faith has no comprehensible object. What this means is that your faith in God is purely a matter of convenience, not truth. And, why search for convenient beliefs when that would be inconvenient?
Wed, 2005-12-07 17:37
You said that God, as the creator would have created because of some lack and lacking something he cant be omnipotent.
God's purpose -- providing for his children
God's desire -- children who are like him
God's lack -- he himself lacks nothing
-- playing with semantics any lack would
have to do with us trying to be like
him
God is our father and we are here to learn to be like him.
Sun, 2006-05-07 18:14
First of all, I want to apologize for both the disorganized structure in which I present the following information and the somewhat repetetive dissertation. I thoroughly enjoyed reading your blog and wish I could have responded in a similarly organized, well thought out, non rambling, and well cited manner. Please forgive the somewhat rambling nature of my response and read it with an open mind as I hope you will.
I have attempted to approach your work with an open mind, detailed analysis and respectful point of view and I hope you would return the favor. Also I probably started heading in a number of directions, started writing towards a number of conclusions, that have instead been left by the wayside. So any direction I start heading and fail to fully flush out, please excuse.
I believe there is a problem in trying to argue logically with our shallow frame of mental capacity in terms of something so far past what we could possibly comprehend, and that any real "God" must be truly beyond our comprehension to exist as a real "God" not just a very powerful creature or spirit of very high extension (but still a creature/spirit that we can limit by our deifnition of a certain extent or power).
By the definition God must be supernatural (beyond what is natural, natural logic, natural limits, natural definitions as explained by mortal human means etc.)
Said God therefore is beyond our total comprehension, otherwise you are working outside of the definition of God as being omni-anything. If we could define God's extent as an omni-something, then we can create the limit of his power in regard to that something.
Arguement regarding the idea of God's being all-powerful:
If God is all powerful, and we as humans can formulate just exactly how powerful he is, give him a sort of "rating" on the power scale of God's power=X. Then we as humans can concieve of something with power=X+1. If we as humans can concieve of something with power=X+1 then either a) God is not omnipotent or b)we have misrated God's power as only valued at power=X.
This leads to a problem when God is rated at a power=X then as humans we can continually create/concieve of something at power=X+1. This problem is similar in essence to the problem with the issue of infinite causes.
As human beings we are "natural things". "Natural things" give birth to "natural ideas". An idea of any sort constitutes a subcategory of the concept of a "thing", so an idea is type of thing. Consequently a "natural idea" is a "natural thing". If a natural thing can concieve of something at a power above something, ie created/concieved of a natural thing more powerful than a supernatural power then either it is impossible for anything supernatural to exist or the natural idea of a supernatural thing is flawed in some way.
I venture that a supernatural thing is flawed in its definition by a natural thing, if the natural thing can define something natural and simultaneously above the supernatural thing. Within the definition of a supernatural thing we must define it as a beyond infinite extent otherwise we can create/concieve of a natural thing of a further extent in some regard than the supernatural thing which defies the definition of the supernatural thing. If we can concieve of something beyond the supernatural thing I would say we have misdefined the supernatural thing to begin with because within our definition of the supernatural thing it is no longer beyond natural.
If we can concieve of a thing (thereby creating a natural thing) beyond the supernatural thing we have misdefined the supernatural thing. If something is supernatural (beyond the natural) we (as natural things) must not be able to give a rating or measurement to the supernatural thing, because otherwise we could concieve of a natural thing greater than the supernatural thing. If we cannot give rating or measurement to the supernatural thing we cannot define it, except in regards to it's inherent immeasurability, it's inherent beyond "natural-ness". If we cannot define the supernatural thing in regards to its level of measurement it must follow that we cannot fully comprehend certain (if not all) aspects of the supernatural thing. These aspects may include omnipotence, omniprescence etc. Specifically aspects beyond our full natural comprehension may be things involving the infinite.
We can only define a supernatural thing as being beyond our natural measurements, and we technically can measure up to infinity minus one. If our comprehension, or our measurement of something were graphed it would form an asymptote at infinity, it would form an asymptote at the supernatural extent of any measurement. If we cannot actually measure these infinite levels of the extent of the supernatural thing's qualities we consequently cannot speak with authority about the workings of these infinite things, otherwise we would hold an authority over the supernatural qualities (in that we can measure their limit) rendering them no longer supernatural.
Under the assumption that we cannot completely define supernatural things, it must follow that if we attempt to define these supernatural things some parts will be beyond our comprehension. If we try to define something beyond our comprehension we will incorrectly define it. Consequently the incorrect definition, when followed to it's logical end will most likely conclude at a mistruth.
I would suggest that the conclusions you reached regarding omnipotence (and the other character traits of God that involve the infinite) are flawed because they have are working from the definition of the infinite. The conclusions you have reached about an omnipotent
All this goes to say really that we can not define the supernatural. Any attempt to define the supernatural will lead to a conclusion that is inherently wrong due to it's subjecting an infinite thing to a finite description.
P.S. This leads to the question of perfection: to what extent can us humans (under the premise that we are imperfect) create a "perfect" entity. I would say we cannot. We can conceive of the existence of a perfect entity, but cannot concieve of the exact qualities or extent of those qualities of the entity. This relates to the idea of being unable to create a wholly new color as described by C.S. Lewis in "Mere christianity". I would challenge you to read this book, and very seriously consider what it presents.
Thank you for taking the time to read this extended and disorganized response.
Mon, 2006-05-08 12:57
wow... I don't think I have ever been so stunned by someone's utter lack of intelligible reasoning skills. There are so many flaws with your treatise. Quite frankly, you are missing the point in what you are saying, and most of your points are arguments from absurdity (look it up if you don't know what an argument from absurdity is). You might want to seriously re-evaluate whether or not you should even be thinking about these questions as you can't even seem to string together a coherent, well-reasoned thought.
Sorry man... but this just was not good >.>
Mon, 2006-05-08 15:14
Evidence?
You are superior.
Wed, 2006-05-10 18:29
I don't know and I don't care. I love God 100% and if you don't believe in him it's O.K. with me, because you are definently going to hell.
Wed, 2006-05-10 19:09
You mean Hel.